Seyed Rasoul Mousavi

نوامبر 10, 2009

The Geopolitics of Caspian Oil: An Overview of Cooperation and Conflict

Filed under: English, مقاله — برچسب‌ها: , , — سید رسول موسوی @ 2:21 ب.ظ.

The Caspian region, as a geographic entity, contains five littoral states but from the geopolitical viewpoint, it is impossible to isolate it from Central Asia and the Caucasus regions and it is too difficult to ignore the important role of Uzbekistan in Central Asia and Georgia in the Caucasus. Although we know that these states are not littoral states of Caspian Sea, it is necessary to emphasize that the future geopolitical situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus will depend on how Caspian oil reserves will be exploited. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of the geopolitics of Caspian oil. To this end, it explains three main subjects: 1) the Caspian Status; 2) Oil reserves of the Caspian Basin; 3) Pipeline options

Following the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caspian region, with its rich hydrocarbon reserves, assumed great significance in the energy politics of the regional states and the global actors. Before this period, the Caspian Sea was known as a common Soviet and Iranian sea and according to 1921 and 1940 pacts it was viewed as a common heritage for both countries. The Soviet Union as a super power monopolized a big portion of the Caspian Sea and did not allow Iran to utilize a fair share of the resources — especially hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian basin. At the time, the US had also accepted that the Caspian region belonged to the former Soviet Union and did not have any interest in using Caspian oil reserves

The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and appearance of new independent states[1] in the Caspian basin beside Iran and Russia changed the geopolitics of the region. This new region was not only a new political phenomenon or new geographic entity, but introduced a vast set of geopolitical and strategic equations into regional and global affairs.

The Caspian region, as a geographic entity, contains five littoral states but from the geopolitical viewpoint, it is impossible to isolate it from Central Asia and the Caucasus regions and it is too difficult to ignore the important role of Uzbekistan in Central Asia and Georgia in the Caucasus. Although we know that these states are not littoral states of Caspian Sea, it is necessary to emphasize that the future geopolitical situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus will depend on how Caspian oil reserves will be exploited.

Currently and in the foreseeable future, oil and gas constitute a significant part of world energy consumption; it should be supplied from reliable and diversified sources and should flow unabatedly. Therefore, the Caspian region is a new energy basin with importance for resource diversification.

Coupled with the landlocked nature of the Caspian region, the development of trans-national export pipelines to transport oil from the Caspian caused competition among companies over the contracts and between states over the final export routes.

The high stakes led to the struggle known as the “New Great Game.”[2] The main actors are the newly independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), Russia, the United States, Iran, Turkey and some international oil firms.

Pipelines are not only significant economically but also confer degrees of control, dictating dependence and influence. The pipeline options were evaluated according to criteria determined by the interests of the main actors in the “New Great Game” and the technical requirement of the oil business.

This paper seeks to provide an analysis of the geopolitics of Caspian oil. To this end, it is necessary to explain three main subjects: 1) the Caspian Status; 2) Oil reserves of the Caspian Basin; 3) Pipeline options.

Efforts Aimed at Defining the Caspian Legal Status

Reaching consensus on the Caspian legal status is one of the main activities of the Caspian littoral states in the post Soviet period. Iran was the first state which proposed a mechanism for using the Caspian Sea as a common heritage for all littoral states. On February 17, 1992 Iran used the opportunity of ECO Summit in Tehran and proposed the idea of «Caspian Sea Cooperation Organization.» At that time, this idea was not rejected; the presidents of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and the Special Envoy of Russian president accepted to follow-up on this in the session of foreign ministers held on February 16. They accepted to form five committees on all issues. These Committees were: Legal Status Committee, Navigation Committee, Fisheries Committee, Environment Committee and Scientific Research Committee.[3]

Thereafter many different ideas were put to the fore on the nature of the Caspian Sea and the question of whether Caspian is a Sea or a lake. Answer to this question assumes different legal and political aspects. In addition, varying interpretations of the 1921 and 1940 Treaties signed by Iran and the Soviet Union started. First Iran, Russia and Turkmenistan believed that, based on these two Treaties, the Caspian Sea is a common heritage for all littoral states and all of them should have equal rights in using Caspian Sea resources; and until the attainment of new consensus on legal status, the 1921 and 1940 Treaties would be a reference for all littoral states. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan interpreted that neither the 1921 nor the 1940 Treaty addressed the question of sea-bed resources and those treaties only provided guidelines for fishing and navigation.

On November 11-12, 1996 the second session of the Caspian states foreign ministerial was held in Ashgabat. At this session all five littoral states accepted the legal status of Caspian Sea, noting that it should be based on the consensus of all five countries. Following this decision, each state designated a Special envoy for Caspian Sea-related Issues, and they formed a working group for defining the Caspian Sea status.[4]

The idea of the Caspian Sea Cooperation Organization was not received well — especially by Azerbaijan that engaged in unilateral activities. In signing new pacts for the development of Azerbaijan oil and gas resources Kazakhstan also followed Azeri interpretation of the Caspian status.

Until 1994 Iran and Russia had a common view about the Caspian status and we can see when Azerbaijan signed an agreement (Contract of the Century) on oil and gas industry in the Caspian Sea, Russia officially protested against this contract. But after this period we see a significant change in Russian policy towards the Caspian Sea. Russia Shifted towards Azerbaijani and Kazakh interpretations of the 1921 and 1940 Treaties regarding sea-bed resources. There are many possible reasons for this shift, but security and economic interests were the main reasons behind it.

Thanks to the efforts of Niazof, the President of Turkmenistan, the Ashgabat Summit was held on 22-23 April 2003. In this summit all presidents of the Caspian littoral State participated. Ashgabat Summit had become a new guideline and stage for multilateral negotiations and bilateral relations between the Caspian states. It also became clear that working out a comprehensive plan on the status of the Sea demands hard and long work of the diplomats, as well as new meetings and talks on all aspects of cooperation on different levels.[5]

All Caspian Sea states pursue their own interests when it comes to the issue of developing the Sea’s oil reserves. Some experts believe that while Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan are more interested in the economic aspect of this issue, Russia pays more attention to the security aspect and Iran to the geopolitical dimension.

After the Ashgabat Summit we can see that all littoral states follow their interests in the Caspian region more fiercely than ever before, and they are clear in their dialog about the interest of each country.

Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan want the Caspian seabed divided along a modified mid-line, with each state free to develop mineral resources in their sector, while cooperating on the use of actual water basin. These three states have come to a trilateral agreement on sub-surface boundaries and collective administration of the Sea’s water. In May 2003, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan divided the northern 64% of the Caspian Sea into three unequal parts along a median line principle, giving Kazakhstan 27%, Russia 19% and Azerbaijan 18%. Accordingly the development of the northern Caspian Sea’s hydrocarbon potential, where most of the regions oil reserves and largest international projects are found, will in all likelihood move forward despite lack of comprehensive regional consensus.

Turkmenistan’s shifting position seems to have moved towards dividing both the seabed and water basin into sectors, with a 20-mile zone in the middle reserved for free navigation.

Iran’s stand seems complicated. Iran first insisted that according to the 1921 and 1940 Treaties, the Caspian Sea is a common Soviet and Iranian Sea, supporting a condominium status for the Caspian Sea. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Condominium status should be sustained and if the littoral states decide to divide the Caspian Sea, this division must be expanded to water and sea-bed as well; and for dividing the Sea, we must use just and fair measures. In such case, the share of Iran will not be less than 20% of Caspian Sea.[6]

After the Ashgabat Summit, the region observed an important new development. In this complicated geopolitical circumstance, Russia carried out an extensive naval exercise in the Caspian Sea in August 2002. More than 60 Russian ships together with the land-based airplanes and thousands of Russian Soldiers have conducted a military maneuver, which covered the non-Russian parts of the Caspian Sea and the deployment of significant number of the newly constructed ships for surveillance purposes.[7] This was a first arrangement of such scale.

Russia never determined an exact purpose for this exercise, but many aims can be described for it, i.e. stabilization of the Caspian Sea, Dagestan and North Caucasus, counterterrorism operation in the Caspian, defense of the South-North Corridor, protection of oil and gas reserves, operation against narcotic trade and smuggling, and emergency aids in the Sea.

Although many reasons were cited for the Russian military exercise, it is still necessary to find the correct answer for these questions:

  • What was the main purpose behind the demonstration of force in a closed Sea? It is well known that in a closed sea there is no access given to foreign states, where Russia maintains forces exceeding those of the remaining countries.
  • What necessitated an increase in an already excessive power, when the other coastal states have no means to accumulate military power?

Recent Developments of the Caspian Status

After the Ashgabat summit we can see two important developments with respect to the Caspian issues:

a) The Signing of Environmental Pact by Five Littoral States

On November 2003, the representatives of five littoral states in Tehran signed the Environmental Pact. It was the first such agreement signed by the five Caspian Basin states since they began to hold talks on the Sea’s status in 1996. Under the environmental agreement, the Caspian States pledged to tackle such problems as industrial pollution, oil refinery and tanker leaks and the energy industry’s potential environmental impact on marine life, including the endangered caviar-producing sturgeon. The Pact, some official noted, shows that Caspian Basin states are prepared to set aside eight years of squabbling in an effort to forge consensus on territorial issues.

Iran fully supports this type of consensus and Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi pointed to the November accord as a model for agreements to come. Although many obstacles remain concerning the implementation of the Environmental Pact, i.e., the ratification of the convention by all five states and agreement on the protocols, but it can be seen as a sign of cooperation.[8]

b) Moscow Meeting on Caspian Related Issues

On April 6, 2004, foreign ministers of the five Caspian littoral states participated in a Moscow meeting on Caspian related issues. Representatives of the Sea’s five littoral states sounded optimistic at this conference and in their conclusion; participants presented an optimistic joint communiqué.

At the conclusion of the talks they noted that «the meeting passed in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding;» they also emphasized that the Caspian Sea is a» Zone for peace, stability and mutual cooperation.»

In a joint Communiqué they mentioned that participants analyzed all dialogs about the Caspian status and they believe there are significant progresses, so participants support the activities of the Committee on Caspian legal status.

In this joint communiqué the participants noted that although there are many different ideas but the states agreed that the remaining points should be solved by consensus and principles of international law. At this meeting the diplomats of the five Caspian states explored the feasibility of hosting the gathering in the second half of the current year in Tehran. Iran proposed hosting the gathering.[9]

Caspian Oil and Gas Reserves

«Energy Security» is an important term not only for the US as a global power but also it is vital for all developed and developing countries, because energy accelerates the development process.

Therefore, states seek to secure uninterrupted and cheap energy from diversified sources; oil and gas account for 60 percent of world’s energy consumption; and in 2020, their share will increase to 66 percent.[10] In this context, the Caspian Sea region is significant for world markets because of its vast oil and gas reserves.

The importance of energy is something and the exaggeration of it is another issue. During the 1990s, the US and British oil multinationals invested billions in the states that encircle the Caspian: Republic of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and their neighbors such as Georgia. What is at stake there can scarcely be exaggerated. In September 1997, the New York Times observed, «Forget mutual funds, commodity futures and corporate mergers; forget South African diamonds, European currencies and Thai stocks. The most concentrated mass of untapped wealth known to exist anywhere is in the oil and gas fields beneath the Caspian Sea and lands around it.”

But after five years Newsweek magazine, in its 8 April 2002 published a report by O. Matthews, who wrote: «It is apparently beyond the limits of journalistic restraint to tell the story of Caspian oil as anything but a breathless spy thriller». The journalist claimed that «the Caspian Basin, at a conservative estimate, contains about 70 billion barrels of oil.»

Speaking on the same day of 8 April in Almaty at the Eurasian Economic Summit, G. M. Gros-Pietro, chairman of Italy’s ENI oil company, said that the Caspian contains only 7.8 billion barrels of oil. ENI is the only Western company that has discovered a new oil field in the Caspian, the Kashagan in Kazakhstan, and I have more confidence in the estimate of its president, although it is tenfold lesser, than the sensationalist journalistic account

Nowadays many analysts say the projection of Caspian oil potential rested on a number of questionable assumptions while the actual amount is much less and instead of the politically bloated appraisal of 200 billion barrels in ostensible Caspian oil reserves (compared with Saudi Arabia’s 260 billion) valued at 4 trillion dollars, exuberantly cultivated for years by the State Department to lure American investors into the region and justify its own strategy there, we are talking today about only 18 billion to 34 billion barrels of reserves, 70% of which are confirmed under the Kazakhstan’s section of the sea, according to another American government agency, the US Energy Information Administration.[11]

And finally, in a report based on Wilton Park Conference 13-18 Oct. 2003 on «The Caspian and Central Asia: Stability and Development» Roger Williamson wrote:

«It can be argued that events of the last three years have led to a decline in the importance of the Caspian Region, compared with Middle East and Central Asia. This is partly as a result of earlier over-estimation of the importance of oil reserves in the Caspian and partly because of security issues linked to Afghanistan and Iraq and now all experts believe that Caspian Sea seems to be more North Sea than Persian Gulf.»

Table 1: Oil and Gas Proven and Resources int he Caspian Basin Countries[12]

Country Oil (million tons) Gas (billion cubic meters)
Proven Reserves Possible Resources ProvenReserves Possible      Resources
Kazakhstan 1,300-2,500 12500 1,040 2,500-3,000
Azerbaijan 500-1,700 4,500 1,100 2,000-2,500
Turkmenistan 75-400 4000-1200 2,800 4000-4,400

Security Concerns

Oil and Gas reserves are valuable only so long as they can reach their market. One of the major problems in developing the Caspian resources is the lack of the transportation routes for oil and gas exports. The Caspian region is thus disadvantaged because it has no direct outlet to the high seas, except the Volga-Don channel, which is frozen for six months a year. This necessitates pipelines to carry the region’s oil to the market. These pipelines must transit third states after they pass through the territories of the Caspian littorals, a fact which translates into economic benefits for the transit states. Also for the producers and the transit states, pipelines have a decisive effect on degrees of control, dependence and influence. Here, the economic and political interests of Russia, Iran, Turkey, USA, the states of Central Asia and Caucasus cross. They are so contradictory that it is unlikely that oil export from Central Asia and Caucasus will start before 2010.

Political instability in the region is one of the major issues which have huge effects in all decisions about pipeline routes, in this respect there are a number of security concerns in the Caspian region.

The stalemate between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh continues, Chechnya is not yet at rest, the future of tension between Georgia and its autonomous regions are not predictable, terrorist groups are active in Central Asia and other internal ethnic problems, consolidation of statehood, economic challenges, the development and improvement of government efficiency are a set of problems in the Caspian Region that would not yield a conclusion about the final routes before examining the interests of the main actors in the region.

In other words, the determination of the pipeline routes to carry the Caspian oil and gas depends on various factors, among them, are the geopolitical concerns of world powers, regional security issues, financial estimates, geographic status of major producers and the existing infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, regional conflicts, political instability and the lack of regional cooperation slowed the development of Caspian Oil and gas reserves hence the deliberations of export routes.

Pipeline Options

As increasing exploration and development in the Caspian Region leads to more production, the littoral states (and Uzbekistan) will have large new quantities of oil and natural gas available for export. Earning hard currency from these resources is essential to regional development plants, as well as to recouping the huge investments made by multi-national oil companies. However, for these purposes, the infrastructure left after the collapse of the Soviet Union is inadequate. Numerous new pipelines and pipeline expansions in each of the cardinal directions have been proposed, and some have been constructed. (See Table 2)

Table 2: Proposed Agreement on Under-Construction Oil Exporting Routes in the Caspian

Route From-To Capacity Length Cost Status
Northern (Russia) Baku-Novorossisk 0.1 Mbd 868 miles $2.4 B Exports began 1998
Western (Georgia) Baku-Supsa 0.6 Mbd 540 miles $600 M Opening delayed
Eastern  (China) Aktyubinsk-Xinjiang 0.4-0.8Mbd 1,800miles $3.5 B. Signed agreement
South Eastern (Pakistan) Charjou-Gwadar 1 Mbd 1,000miles $2.5 B. Memo signed
South Western (Persian Gulf) Turkmenbashi-Kharg Island 0.2-0.4Mbd 930 miles $1.5 B. Objected by U.S.
Caspian PipeLine Consortium Tengiz-Novorossisk 1.34Mbd 930 miles $2.2B Exports begins 1999
AlOC Main (Turkey) Baku-Ceyhan 1 Mbd 1,100miles $3.0 B Not finalized
Cross Caspian I Tengiz-Baku 0.4 Mbd 370 miles UW $3.0 B Feasibility study
Cross Caspian II Turkmenbashi- Baku 0.5 Mbd 190 miles UW $2.5 B Feasibility study

The competition for pipeline routes is not only for oil but it depends much on the outcome, because these pipeline will not simply carry oil but will also define new corridors of trade and power. The nation or alliance that controls pipeline routes could hold sway over the Caspian region for decades to come.

An American analyst argued at the time: «Intense competition over the routing of the first generation of pipelines has emerged, in part, because all parties are aware that the sequencing of pipeline development will influence the political and economic orientation of the SCCA region for the next decade.”[13]

America became very eager to have a strong hand in this issue. In fact, getting Caspian oil and gas out of the region and into the global market was a key geopolitical issue for Washington policy toward the region and its relations with the actors in this area. For this, one of the top foreign policy priorities of the Clinton administration during his second period was strong support for building pipelines to transport oil from the Caspian Region to the market. The administration, indeed, took a particular interest in the pipeline policy in 1997.[14] Kazakh Ambassador Richard L. Morningstar enthused about one of the US pipeline projects: «U.S. support for multiple pipelines and the East-West energy transport corridor is part of our broader foreign policy interests in the region.»[15]

Changing the region’s energy flow to an East-West axis towards Europe, from the existing North-South axis towards Russia (which will effectively minimize dependence on Russia), is integral to the development goals of the US policy planners. The region’s three biggest pipeline projects, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium Project (CPC), the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC), and the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline (Baku-Tiblisi-Erzurum-BTE) are establishing the framework for this new axis.

Russia’s Exclusive Strategy

While BTC pipeline is under construction, Russia follows up her exclusive strategy. Russia’s strategic aim is to transit the large part of the Caspian oil and gas to the world market through Russia. Russia dose not have any important oil reserves in her Caspian territory so she tries to transit the large part of Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s oil and gas through Russian territory.

Kazakhstan, which possesses the huge reserves of the Caspian oil, is in the focal point of Putin’s strategy at present. The presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia have signed a protocol to the 1998 Agreement on Delimitation of the Northern Seabed of the Caspian, which legalized the division of the intermediate modified line through the oilfields of Kurmangazy, Central and Khvalynsk. In June 2002 Russia and Kazakhstan signed the agreements, which have provided Russia with a monopoly to transit oil from Kazakhstan for the coming years. According to one of these agreements, since 2003, 15 million tons of oil per annum will be transported through the pipeline from Atyrau (Kazakhstan) to Samara (the city on Volga River, in the central part of Russia). The term of the contract is 15 years. Another agreement with the term of 15 years provides the annual transportation of 2.5 million tons of the Kazakh oil by tankers to Russia’s Caspian coasts, from where the oil will be transported by the pipeline through the Northern Caucasus to Novorossiysk, a Russian port on the Black Sea coast. The significant part of the Russian produced oil goes through this terminal too.[16]

It is planned that Novorossiysk terminal will receive 28 million tons of the Kazakh oil exports per annum through the pipeline Tengiz-Novorossiysk. This pipeline, which is constructed, mainly, for the transportation of oil from a giant Tengiz oilfield started to function last year. This pipeline from 2005 will transport the above-mentioned volume of oil.

Thus, approximately 45 million tons of Kazakh oil exports in total will be transported through the Russian export routes. This number exceeds Kazakhstan’s oil export in 2001, which made up about 28 million tons. In other words, Russia has acquired a prerogative to transit the Kazakh oil, and its increased export supplies will go through Russia as well. The prospects of Kazakhstan’s oil production for both domestic consumption and export are astonishing 55 million tons annually from 2005 and 120 million tons from 2015. In order to be able to manage such a supply, Moscow is working out longer-term plans than the European consumers.

Russia is also planning to develop its own network of pipelines in order to transport the Kazakh oil through Samara to the terminal, which is being constructed in Russia’s East coasts of the Baltic Sea. In order to finance this project, the Russian government is trying to use its own limited resources and attract Kazakhstan’s investment.

The agreement signed in May 2002 on the division of the seabed of the Northern Caspian acknowledges the jurisdiction of Kazakhstan over a promising Kurmangazy oil deposit, but at the same time, it says that this deposit will be exploited jointly by Kazakhstan and Russia on an equal basis. Thus about 45 million tons of Kazakh oil exports have been promised to go through the Russian export routes. This obligation considerably exceeds the present capabilities of Kazakhstan’s oil export which in 2001 made up 28 million tons. In other words Russia has secured a right to transport oil from Kazakhstan in advance, assuring that any increase of Kazakh export will pass through Russian territory. As it Seems, Moscow is taking quicker steps than the western consumer countries in order to have a control over the future export of Kazakh oil.

Iran and Oil Swapping

One of the main obstacles for Iran to develop her oil industry in the Caspian Sea is Iran Sanction Act which is imposed by the US government. The Iran-Libya Sanction Act (ILSA) has directly affected Caspian pipeline development through Iran’s territory. In practice, ILSA banned foreign direct investment in Iran’s energy capability and infrastructure and applied to the United States business as well as third parties, although there is little provision for international coordination or enforcement.

The US position on energy-related matters in the region has been clear: It has been discouraging the laying of oil and gas pipelines through Iran while inducing US investment. Washington has been working to promote westbound pipelines from t-he Caspian Basin, particularly the BTC oil pipeline, which will run from Baku, Azerbaijan, through Tbilisi, Georgia to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey.

Iran always criticizes US backing of the BTC oil pipeline and claims that there is no need for the multi-billion-dollar project, because Iranian route to transport Caspian oil is the shortest and the least expensive. Iran Counteracts for a part of US sanction about Iranian route by investing to develop swap infrastructures.

On April 29 Iran inaugurates Caspian oil swap project. This project facilitates access of Caspian states to high seas. A major part of the project includes Neka oil terminal,[17] crude oil mixing installations. Pumping station is situated 321 Km of 30-32 inches pipeline and installations for carrying oil from Neka to Tehran and Tabriz refineries. The project costs 330 million dollars and its current capacity is about 170,000 barrels per day, which can be increased up to 500,000 barrels a day in two stages. Stage one involves 370,000 barrels a day and stage two 500,000 barrels a day.

Repayment of Capital and costs will be done through swap revenues. Customers of the National Iranian oil company will deliver Caspian Crude to Neka and receive an equivalent amount of oil in the Persian Gulf. Crude comes from Russia’s Siberia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It mixes with light oil inside reservoirs in Neka and the resulting oil, which is called mixed oil will flow to Tehran and Tabriz refineries through Neka-Sari and Ray-Sari-Namrod pipelines. Iran obtains 2 dollars per barrel and also saves the expenses of oil pumping from south to north.

[1] These five states are the Republic of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan.

[2] The term “Great Game” was originally coined by R. Kepling to refer to the 19th century Anglo-Russian rivalry for hegemony in Central Asia. After the demise of the USSR, this term has been used by analysts and observers of the Caspian region to describe various efforts to fill the strategic void – ranging from military venture to competition over energy resources and pipelines.

[3] Abbas Maleki, “Efforts of the Littoral States in Resolving Caspian Sea’s Legal Regime,” Central Asia and the Caucasus Review, No. 41, Spring  2003, pp. 23-24.

[4] Ibid., p. 26.

[5] Ibid., p. 28.

[6] Mehdi Safari, “Central Asia and the Caspian Sea: Priorities and Development,” Central Asia and the Caucasus Review, No. 43, Fall 2003, p. 80.

[7] Yakou S. Umanksy, “The Caspian Oil: Geopolitics and Geo-economic Implications,” Marco Polo Magazine, 3-2003, pp. 4-5.

[8] For more information on Caspian’s environmental issues see: Abbas Maleki, “The Caspian Sea and Environmental Necessities: Cooperation for Confronting Problems,” Amu Darya, Spring and Summer 2003, Vol. 7, No. 14 &15, pp. 71-113.

[9] Iran News Agency (IRNA), April 7, 2004.

[10] US Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2000.

[11] US Energy Information Administration: Caspian Sea Region. http://www.eia.doe/gov/emeu/caspfull.

[12] Igor Tomberg, “Energy Policy in the Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Central Asia and the Caucasus (4:22) 2003, Center for Social and Political Studies, Sweden, p. 72.

[13] Sheila N. Heslin, “Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development: Status, Significance, and Outlook,” Working Paper, James Baker Institute for Public Policy, April 1998.

[14] Joe Barns, “US National Interests: Getting Beyond the Hype,” in Yelena Kalyuzhnova, Amy Myers Jaft, Dov Lynch and Robin C. Sickles eds, Energy in the Caspian Region, Palgrave, New York, 2002, pp. 212-233.

[15] Testimony by Ambassador Richard L. Morning Star, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, Before the Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Exports and Trade Promotion, Wednesday March 3, 1999.

[16] Yakov S. Umansky, Op. Cit., p. 5.

[17] IRNA, April 29, 2004.


نوشتن دیدگاه »

هنوز دیدگاهی داده نشده است.

RSS feed for comments on this post. TrackBack URI

پاسخی بگذارید

در پایین مشخصات خود را پر کنید یا برای ورود روی شمایل‌ها کلیک نمایید:

نشان‌وارهٔ وردپرس.کام

شما در حال بیان دیدگاه با حساب کاربری خود هستید. بیرون رفتن /  تغییر دادن )

عکس گوگل

شما در حال بیان دیدگاه با حساب کاربری Google خود هستید. بیرون رفتن /  تغییر دادن )

تصویر توییتر

شما در حال بیان دیدگاه با حساب کاربری Twitter خود هستید. بیرون رفتن /  تغییر دادن )

عکس فیسبوک

شما در حال بیان دیدگاه با حساب کاربری Facebook خود هستید. بیرون رفتن /  تغییر دادن )

درحال اتصال به %s

ساخت یک وب‌گاه یا وب‌نوشت رایگان در وردپرس.کام.

%d وب‌نوشت‌نویس این را دوست دارند: